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SCHOOL CLOSURES AND PARENTAL CONTROL:
REINTERPRETING THE SCOPE AND
PROTECTION OF PARENTS’ DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO DIRECT THEIR CHILDREN’S
EDUCATION
Timothy W. Schubert*
When COVID-19 hit U.S. shores, it was not long until state governments
shuttered both public and private schools. As the closures continued, some
parents, hoping to get their children back into the classroom, challenged the
constitutionality of school closures, alleging that the closures abridged their
due process right to direct the upbringing of their children—commonly
referred to as the Meyer-Pierce right. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
yet to articulate the contours of this right or the level of constitutional
protection it commands. With little guidance from the Court, lower courts
have come to differing conclusions about how to interpret the right. As such,
it is unclear whether school closures do indeed unconstitutionally abridge
parental rights.
This Note analyzes the history of the Meyer-Pierce right, how it has been
interpreted over time, and how courts have come to differing conclusions
about it. Specifically, this Note investigates how these differing views have
come to bear in the context of school closures by investigating the Ninth
Circuit’s since-vacated opinion in Brach v. Newsom. To help resolve the
confusion and disagreement among circuits and to promote consistency
within Meyer-Pierce case law, this Note proposes a new framework for
interpreting the Meyer-Pierce right. Applying this framework to school
closures, this Note concludes that the Brach majority’s conclusion was
correct and outlines circumstances under which school closures may indeed
unconstitutionally abridge parental rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Few things are more familiar to the average American than the structure
of formal education: teachers guiding students through lecture and
interactive activities conducted in an in-person, congregative setting.
Historically, in-person education was taken for granted—how else would
kids receive an education? Although distance learning options have existed
for some time in America, they have hardly represented the norm.1 Enter the
digital age, where virtual technology has enabled schools to conduct online
learning through third-party software and websites. With online education,
teachers can conduct class when in-person instruction is inconvenient,
impracticable, or potentially something worse.
That “something worse” came in the form of a virus, SARS-CoV-2, which
is responsible for COVID-19—a highly contagious and deadly disease that
led states to institute social distancing measures and bring large sectors of
their economies online, including schools.2
While the accessibility of technology presented a practical solution for
society to continue to educate generations of children, over time, many have
voiced frustration and opposition to virtual learning.3 Some also worry that
the virtual mode is not a comparable substitute for in-person learning.4
Indeed, many hold school closures responsible for weaker academic gains
over the 2020–2021 school year.5 Studies also indicate that school closures
have negatively affected children’s mental health.6
Given these concerns, both public and private school parents have sought
relief from the closures by challenging their constitutionality in the courts.7
Specifically, some parents have argued that the measures violate their due
process right to direct the upbringing of their children.8
1. Distance learning options arose during the eighteenth century, but they were by no
means the norm. See Edward J. Banas & W. Frances Emory, History and Issues of Distance
Learning, 22 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 365, 365–66 (1998) (noting that distance learning was considered
“non-traditional” and that it has only recently become “mainstream”).
2. See infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., EMMA DORN ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., COVID-19 AND LEARNING LOSS—
DISPARITIES GROW AND STUDENTS NEED HELP, at 8 exhibit 6 (2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/covid-19-andlearning-loss-disparities-grow-and-students-need-help
[https://perma.cc/Z5CH-UA62]
(comparing various degrees of improvement in remote learning and concluding that even with
significant improvements, students would still suffer greater academic loss than if in-person
instruction resumed); see also infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
6. See DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATION IN A PANDEMIC: THE DISPARATE IMPACTS OF
COVID-19 ON AMERICA’S STUDENTS 2–3 (2021).
7. Some parents have challenged closures on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g.,
Kentucky ex rel. Danville Christian Acad., 981 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2020); Monclova
Christian Acad. v. Toledo-Lucas Cnty. Health Dep’t, 984 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2020); Beahn
v. Gayles, No. 20-2239, 2021 WL 3172272, at *1 (D. Md. July 26, 2021). Others have
challenged closures on due process grounds. See, e.g., Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904, 924–
25 (9th Cir.), vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.); Aviles v. De Blasio, No. 20 Civ.
9829, 2021 WL 796033, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2021).
8. See, e.g., Brach, 6 F.4th at 909.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the due process right of
parents to guide their children’s education9—commonly referred to as the
Meyer-Pierce right.10 This right developed early in the Supreme Court’s due
process jurisprudence and was subject to a different constitutional analysis
than courts use to evaluate abridgements of individual rights today.11 And
while the Court has continuously reaffirmed the Meyer-Pierce right,12 it has
not yet articulated how to interpret it within the modern framework.13 With
so little guidance from the Court, lower courts have come to different
conclusions about how the Meyer-Pierce right fits into the modern
framework of due process.14
For example, many federal courts see the right as only protecting parents’
ability to select private schools.15 However, not all courts have adopted this
view,16 and scholars tend to find that the right affords parents something
more than merely an interest in selecting privately operated schools.17 Courts
have also split on what level of scrutiny infringements of the Meyer-Pierce
right should be subject to.18 Some have concluded that state infringements
of the Meyer-Pierce right are only subject to rational basis review19—a
highly deferential standard that almost always results in the state actions to
which it is applied being upheld.20 Yet the Court’s Meyer-Pierce
jurisprudence, as well as scholarly analysis of the case law, suggests that
parental rights warrant stronger protection than is available under rational
basis review.21 And indeed, some courts apply strict scrutiny to

9. See infra Parts I, II.
10. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005). The
Meyer-Pierce right comes from two Supreme Court cases from the early twentieth century.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S 510,
534–35 (1925).
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990)
(acknowledging that the Meyer-Pierce right is a constitutionally protected right); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (acknowledging that the Meyer-Pierce right is a
long-protected liberty under the Due Process Clause); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 66 (2000) (noting the fundamental right of parents to control their children’s education).
13. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 537
(2000) (explaining that the Court has left “considerable doubt” as to how parental rights fit
into the modern framework).
14. See infra Parts I.B, II.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d on other grounds
sub nom. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that a law
mandating the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance at private schools violated parents’
Meyer-Pierce right).
17. See infra notes 86–91, 129–30 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts I.A, II.A.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.A.2.
20. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the limited burden states must
satisfy under rational basis review).
21. See infra Part I.
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abridgements of the right—a standard that typically finds the relevant state
action unconstitutional.22
Notwithstanding the circuit courts’ differing views concerning parental
rights among circuits, in Brach v. Newsom,23 a panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that California’s school closures abridged parents’
Meyer-Pierce right.24 The court found that imbedded in the Meyer-Pierce
right was a protected parental interest in procuring in-person education.25
Additionally, the court held that strict scrutiny was the proper standard to
review the closures.26
But is Brach’s analysis and robust protection of the Meyer-Pierce right
correct?27 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit later vacated its opinion in Brach,
signaling that the decision by the three-judge panel may have been
incorrect.28 Moreover, might the context of a pandemic warrant greater
deference to the state?29 For instance, some argue that during public health
crises, courts should exercise greater deference toward state public health
prerogatives, in part because, unlike states, the judiciary lacks the expertise
necessary to respond to and resolve such crises.30 Given these differing
views of both parental rights and the need for deference to states’ public
health judgments, courts (and states) must have clear standards to properly
accommodate parental rights and the interests of public health.
This Note clarifies the proper scope of the Meyer-Pierce right and the
protection it is entitled to under the U.S. Constitution. Part I of this Note
examines the legal basis for the Meyer-Pierce right.31 Part I then analyzes
subsequent Supreme Court cases to understand how the Court has interpreted
the Meyer-Pierce right over time.32 Part II looks at the competing views of
parental rights and investigates how each view bears on parental rights in the
context of pandemic-related school closures.33 Part III resolves the differing
views among courts by setting forth a consistent framework that courts

22. See infra note 149 (discussing the heavy burden states must satisfy under strict
scrutiny).
23. 6 F.4th 904 (9th Cir.), vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
24. Id. at 929.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 931.
27. Id. at 945 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent compels the application of
rational basis review).
28. See Brach v. Newsom, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
29. Brach, 6 F.4th at 945 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting) (calling for deference to the state’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic).
30. See Michelle M. Mello & Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health Law After Covid-19, 385
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2021); see also S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140
S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that states must have broad
authority to act and that judges should not interfere where that broad authority has not been
exceeded); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 78 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing that states must have wide authority to act expeditiously in response to
changing facts during a pandemic).
31. See infra Part I.A.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See infra Part II.
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should use to review Meyer-Pierce claims.34 Applying this test, Part III
concludes that under certain circumstances, the closure of private schools35
infringes on parental rights and should be subject to strict scrutiny.36
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE PROTECTION OF PARENTS’ RIGHT
TO DIRECT THEIR CHILDREN’S EDUCATION
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in part, that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”37 The
Supreme Court has long interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as containing a substantive component that protects
unenumerated rights from government interference.38 However, it is not
always clear which rights are protected. During the Lochner era,39 the Court
only protected a laundry list of generally defined unenumerated liberties.40
However, the Court eventually repudiated Lochner as an instance of
unwarranted judicial activism.41 Following Lochner’s repudiation, and in an
effort to contain the potential for judicial activism flowing from substantive

34. See infra Part III.A.
35. For reasons set forth in Part III, the scope of the Meyer-Pierce case law suggests that
public school parents’ interests are not constitutionally burdened by the administrative
discretion of the state in operating public schools. Hence, this Note concludes that the closure
of public schools need only satisfy rational basis review. This Note does not endeavor to agree
or disagree with this state of affairs as a normative matter and instead seeks to describe what
the law says about this area of parental rights.
36. See infra Part III.B.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (protecting the right of parents to
bring up their children); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (protecting the
parents’ ability to select private schools for their children); see also Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (protecting the fundamental right to be free from unwanted
medical treatment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (acknowledging the
“long line of cases” in which the Due Process Clause has been invoked to protect individual
liberties from governmental infringement); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05
(2015) (finding the right of same-sex couples to marry protected by the Due Process Clause).
For a discussion of the long history of substantive due process jurisprudence, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501 (1999).
39. The Lochner era is a since-repudiated period of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the
first third of the twentieth century, which lasted until about 1937 and is characterized by an
aggressive protection of economic liberties under the Due Process Clause. See generally
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at
1502–03.
40. Among the rights protected were the right to be free from bodily restraint, to contract,
“to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
to establish a home and bring up children, to worship God . . . and to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
41. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is gone when
this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike down . . . laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.”); see also Timothy M. Tymkovich et al., A Workable Substantive
Due Process, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1961, 1979 (2020) (noting that the court “reneged” on
its Lochner jurisprudence); Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1503 (stating that the Court has
since repudiated its Lochner jurisprudence).
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due process,42 the Court’s approach shifted to providing heightened
constitutional protection only for narrowly defined liberties that are deemed
sufficiently “fundamental.”43
Another difficulty involves what level of protection to afford liberties—
fundamental or otherwise—under the Due Process Clause. During the
Lochner era, the Court would strike down state actions for “unreasonabl[y]”
abridging protected rights.44 However, in part because substantive due
process “place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate,”45 the Court
developed a new test in an attempt to do what Lochner did not: properly
account for the will of the voting public.46 It is enough, for our purposes, to
say that the post-Lochner test, which is used to determine how rigorously
courts should scrutinize abridgements of protected rights under the Due
Process Clause, is as follows: when a state action infringes on a
“fundamental” right, the action must satisfy strict scrutiny, but when it does
not touch on a fundamental right, it need only satisfy rational basis review.47
Strict scrutiny requires that the state action be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.48 Rational basis review, however, requires only
42. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (“In an attempt to limit and
guide interpretation of the [Due Process] Clause, we have insisted not merely that the
interest . . . be ‘fundamental’ . . . but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our
society.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965) (declining to apply the Due
Process Clause as in Lochner because the Court “do[es] not sit as a super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditions”); see also Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of
Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 541–42 (2015) (noting that one of the main critiques of
Lochner and substantive due process was that it “allowed judges to import their political
values into the Constitution”).
43. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; see also Ryan C.
Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 427 (2010).
Some consider a “fundamental right” to be only those rights rooted in historical tradition and
routinely protected against government interference throughout history. See, e.g., Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 122. However, history may not always be dispositive in determining whether a
given liberty interest is “fundamental.” See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003)
(noting that history is a “starting point” for substantive due process but not the “ending point”).
44. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; see also Tymkovich et al., supra
note 41, at 1979.
45. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
46. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-5, at 1451, § 16-6,
at 1451–54 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the framework of tiered scrutiny attempts to balance the
interests of political control and individual rights); see also Colby & Smith, supra note 42, at
542 (noting that one of the main critiques of Lochner was the Court’s failure to defer to the
judgment of the legislature on matters of policy).
47. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–22; see also Williams, supra note 43, at 427.
Some courts have also applied “intermediate scrutiny” in reviewing fundamental rights. See,
e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding that
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review for parental rights). Intermediate
scrutiny requires that the government action be substantially related to an important state
purpose. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976). However, some argue that
intermediate scrutiny is merely a vessel for judicial activism because of the uncertainty
surrounding what constitutes an “important” state purpose and whether the action is
“substantially” related to it. See id. at 220–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–22 (noting that abridgements of fundamental
rights require that the state action be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”);
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that the state action be rationally related to achieving a legitimate state
interest.49 Going forward, this Note will refer to the post-Lochner test as
either the “modern framework” or “tiered scrutiny.”
A. The Origin of Parents’ Right to Direct the Upbringing of Their Children
The right of parents to direct their children’s upbringing originated from
three Lochner-era cases: Meyer v. Nebraska,50 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters
of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,51 and Farrington v. Tokushige.52 As
such, this part looks at each of these cases to understand the history and
original conception of parental rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
1. Meyer v. Nebraska
On April 9, 1919, then Governor of Nebraska Samuel McKelvie signed
into law a bill prohibiting anyone from teaching any subject to any person in
any language other than English until such person had successfully passed
the eighth grade.53
The bill was passed in response to a perceived threat of German-American
disloyalty in the wake of World War I.54 It was also emblematic of complex
societal and cultural tensions that had long been brewing between immigrant
groups and multigenerational Americans.55 Some states, fueled by
anti-immigrant sentiment, tried to promote assimilation and subvert
purported anti-American disloyalty among immigrant populations by
adopting universal common schooling.56 Others—like Nebraska—targeted
the teaching of foreign languages.57
Meyer, an instructor at Zion Parochial School, was convicted of
unlawfully instructing a student in German.58 Following his conviction,
see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (requiring that legislation abridging
fundamental rights be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). For a discussion of strict scrutiny,
see TRIBE, supra note 46, § 16-5, at 1451, § 16-6, at 1451–54.
49. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (finding that a state action not abridging a
fundamental right need only be “rationally related to [a] legitimate government interest[]”);
see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that rational basis review
requires only that legislation be rationally related to a legitimate government interest); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); Casey, 505 U.S. at 871
(Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of rational basis review, see TRIBE, supra note
46, § 16-2, at 1439–43.
50. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
51. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
52. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
53. See Jack W. Rodgers, The Foreign Language Issue in Nebraska, 1918–1923, 39 NEB.
HIST., no. 1, 1958, at 1, 12–13.
54. See id. at 2–3 (noting that the loyalty of German Americans to the United States was
deemed “suspect”).
55. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1009 (1992).
56. See id. at 1007.
57. Id. at 1011–12.
58. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923); see Woodhouse, supra note 55, at 1013.
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Meyer challenged the statute in Nebraska state court, arguing that it
improperly prevented citizens from procuring foreign language instruction
for their children.59
After an unsuccessful challenge in state court, Meyer appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.60 The question before the Court was whether the statute
abridged protected liberties under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.61 While the Court did not “define with exactness” the liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, it noted that among them was the
right to “bring up children.”62 The Court also found that Nebraska’s law
abridged this right by preventing parents from procuring instruction for their
children in German.63
The Court noted that there was no emergency to justify completely
prohibiting German instruction,64 and there was little basis for believing—as
the state had argued—that the statute was meant to protect children’s health
and the public welfare because it only targeted the teaching of German,
leaving untouched “other matters.”65 Nor could the Court find that mere
knowledge of the German language was harmful.66 To the Court, even if the
German language posed some risk of fostering disloyalty, such risk was not
enough to justify completely prohibiting German instruction.67 Accordingly,
the Court found Nebraska’s law unreasonable and consequently
unconstitutional.68 However, the Court acknowledged that the state
possessed broad power to “reasonably” regulate schools and to even require
instruction in English.69
2. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary
On November 7, 1922, Oregon adopted a statute that compelled parents to
send their children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school.70
The statute, by requiring that children be sent to public school, threatened the
elimination of private schools.71 Accordingly, two private elementary
schools—Hill Military Academy and the Roman Catholic Society of
59. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 102 (Neb. 1922).
60. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
61. Id. at 399.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 403.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 400.
67. See id. at 403 (“[M]ere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful is not enough
to justify its abolition, although regulation may be entirely proper.”).
68. Id. at 402. Meyer follows in Lochner’s footsteps by requiring state action to be
reasonable. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
69. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402; see also Aaron Saiger, State Regulation of Curriculum in
Private Religious Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, in JASON BEDRICK ET AL., RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY OF YESHIVAS VS. NEW YORK 49, 51 (2020) (noting
that Meyer preserved room for states to impose “fairly demanding” regulations on private
schools).
70. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S 510, 530 (1925).
71. Id. at 534.
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Sisters—challenged the law.72 The schools posited that the bill conflicted
with parents’ right to choose schools that provided “appropriate mental and
religious training.”73 The lower court agreed.74
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and,
relying on Meyer, found the bill to have “unreasonably interfere[d]” with
parents’ right to direct the upbringing of their children.75 In the Court’s view,
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him . . .
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.”76 The Court followed Meyer in acknowledging that
states may do a lot to reasonably regulate private schools.77 However, in the
Court’s view, completely abolishing private schools went beyond the state’s
reasonable regulatory power.78 The Court also noted that there were no
unusual circumstances, emergencies, or dangers inherent in private schooling
to justify its total abolition.79
3. Farrington v. Tokushige
Two years after Pierce, the Court yet again had a parental rights case on
its docket. In Farrington, plaintiffs80 challenged an act of Hawaii’s
legislature81 that restricted attendance at foreign language schools and
required such schools to comply with a myriad of regulations and fees.82
Under the act, a “foreign language school” was one that “conducted [classes]
in any language other than the English language or Hawaiian language.”83
The Court found that the legislation at issue impermissibly infringed on
plaintiffs’ Meyer-Pierce right.84 According to the Court, the legislation went
“far beyond mere regulation of privately-supported schools” by effectively
“depriv[ing] parents of [a] fair opportunity to procure for their children
instruction which they think important and we cannot say is harmful.”85
Broadly speaking, scholars tend to see Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington as
representing the values of pluralism underlying the Constitution,86 while also
72. Id. at 531–33.
73. Id. at 532.
74. Id. at 533–34.
75. Id. at 534–35.
76. Id. at 535.
77. To the Court, states were able to “reasonably regulate” schools, to inspect them as
well as their students and teachers, to regulate their curriculum, to compel attendance at some
school—public or private—and to ensure that nothing “manifestly inimical to the public” be
taught. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 535.
79. Id. at 534.
80. The plaintiffs in Farrington were privately operated foreign language schools
operating in Hawaii. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 291 (1927).
81. 1920 Haw. Sess. Laws 30.
82. See Farrington, 273 U.S. at 291–94.
83. Id. at 291.
84. Id. at 298.
85. Id.
86. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 18–20 (2002) (discussing the zone of free
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preserving some room for state regulation.87 Although the cases left the exact
scope of parental rights undefined,88 many scholars read them as preventing
state regulations that completely prevent, or substantially obstruct, parents’
ability to obtain a specific type of instruction for their children89 that is not
inherently harmful or injurious to the public welfare.90 Accordingly, some
note that, at a minimum, these cases prevent the interests of the public or
parents from presumptively trumping the other.91
B. The Evolution of the Meyer-Pierce Right and the “Reasonable Relation”
Test
Following Farrington, the Court did not address parents’ interest in
controlling their children’s education until after Lochner’s repudiation. The
first such case was Wisconsin v. Yoder.92
In Yoder, Amish families wishing to keep their children out of traditional
primary schools challenged Wisconsin’s compulsory education laws, which
required parents to send their children to public or private schools until the
age of sixteen.93 The Court read Pierce narrowly, limiting its holding to the
right of parents to direct their children’s religious education.94 In doing so,
association produced by Meyer-Pierce and warning that if such a zone were abolished in favor
of uniformity, social pluralism would cease to exist); George M. von Stamwitz, Constitutional
Limitations on a State’s Ability to Regulate Private Schools, 2 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.F. 131,
146–47 (1982) (reading Pierce as “preserving the diversity and creativity” private schools
offer); TRIBE, supra note 46, § 15-6, at 1319 (noting that Meyer and Pierce protect individuals’
ability to “heed the music of different drummers”); see also Woodhouse, supra note 55, at
996–97 (describing Meyer-Pierce as “liberal icons” standing for the ideal of “pluralism”).
While there are legitimate critiques of Meyer and Pierce regarding their illiberal understanding
of children’s rights, this critique goes beyond the scope of this Note. See generally
Woodhouse, supra note 55.
87. GALSTON, supra note 86, at 19–20 (discussing the distinct and permissible zones of
regulation produced by Meyer and Pierce).
88. See von Stamwitz, supra note 86, at 143; Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and
the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1088–89 (noting that Meyer and Pierce left intact the
state’s ability to regulate children’s education to some extent).
89. See TRIBE, supra note 46, § 15-6, at 1319 (noting that Meyer and Pierce prevent the
state from “completely foreclosing the opportunity of individuals and groups to heed the music
of different drummers”); Saiger, supra note 69, at 51 (noting that Meyer and Farrington
“establish that the federal Constitution prohibits not only a ban on private schooling, but also
regulatory regimes that hobble them”); Kelly Rodden, Note, The Children’s Internet
Protection Act in Public Schools: The Government Stepping on Parents’ Toes?, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2141, 2170 (2003) (noting that so long as the regulation does not completely foreclose
opportunity for parental decision-making, it is constitutional under Meyer and Pierce).
90. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 937, 1005–06 (1996) (noting that Meyer and Pierce’s test of reasonableness looks at
whether the object of state regulation is “manifestly inimical to public welfare” or inherently
harmful).
91. See GALSTON, supra note 86, at 18–19 n.8; see also TRIBE, supra note 46, § 15-6, at
1319; Saiger, supra note 69, at 51; Rodden, supra note 89, at 2170.
92. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
93. Id. at 207.
94. “As . . . [Pierce] suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing
and education of their children . . . have a high place in our society.” Id. at 213–14 (emphasis
added).
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the Court distinguished between secular interests on the one hand, which did
not prevent states from reasonably regulating education, and religious
interests on the other, which the Court found to trigger First Amendment
protections.95
Ultimately, the Court held that Wisconsin’s law abridged the Yoders’
ability to direct their children’s religious upbringing, and applying strict
scrutiny, found the law unconstitutional.96 As such, Yoder created a
dichotomy of less searching review for state actions abridging parents’
secular interests in their children’s education and heightened scrutiny for
actions abridging parents’ religious interests in their children’s education.97
Additionally, Justice Byron White stressed the limited scope of the Pierce
decision, noting that it only protected parents’ ability to choose an
educational forum.98
Following Yoder, the Court again addressed the Meyer-Pierce right in
Runyon v. McCrary.99 There, Black families sued a Virginia private school
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866100 after being denied admission because
of the school’s race-based admissions practices.101
The school’s
proprietors—the Runyons—argued that the Act abridged parents’
Meyer-Pierce right by limiting parents’ ability to pursue racially segregated
private schooling.102 The Court stated that, while parents have a right to
choose private schools offering “specialized instruction,” private schools
were still subject to “reasonable government regulation.”103 The Court then
concluded that the Act was “reasonable” and thus constitutional under
Meyer-Pierce.104
The next major case discussing the Meyer-Pierce right was Troxel v.
Granville.105 At issue in Troxel was a Washington state statute that allowed
courts to permit visitation rights for individuals, against the wishes of the
parents, if the court found that doing so was in the child’s best interest.106
The Troxels, the children’s grandparents, sought visitation rights of their

95. “A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have
the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.” Id. at
215.
96. Id. at 234–35.
97. See Gilles, supra note 90, at 942.
98. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring); see also Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455, 461–62 (1973) (stressing the “limited scope of Pierce” and noting that it simply
“affirmed the right of private schools to exist”).
99. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Under subsection (a), every citizen of the United States shall
have the same right in every state to “make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens.” Id.
101. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 165.
102. See id. at 175–78.
103. Id. at 178.
104. See id.
105. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
106. Id. at 60.
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grandchildren in Washington Superior Court.107 Granville, the children’s
mother, wanted to limit visitation, but pursuant to the statute, the lower court
rejected Granville’s proposal and opted for a middle ground between the two
parties’ proposals.108
On appeal, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause provides
“heightened protection” against government abridgement of fundamental
rights.109 Concluding that the Meyer-Pierce right was fundamental,110 the
Court found the statute at issue unconstitutional.111 Though the plurality did
not specifically articulate the precise standard of review it was applying,112
Justice Thomas, in concurrence, noted that in his view, strict scrutiny was
appropriate.113 Dissenting, Justice Anthony Kennedy stressed that because
the Meyer-Pierce right exists only in broad formulation, courts must interpret
the right narrowly when applying it to novel facts.114
II. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE MEYER-PIERCE RIGHT IN THE LOWER
COURTS
Since the Court’s decision in Troxel, lower courts have split on how to
interpret the Meyer-Pierce right within the modern framework. Principally,
the disagreement revolves around (1) the proper scope of parental rights
under Meyer and Pierce115 and (2) how heavily courts must scrutinize
abridgements of the Meyer-Pierce right.116 Part II.A discusses the differing
views among lower courts, and Part II.B explores these competing views in
the context of school closures by looking at the majority and dissenting
opinions in Brach v. Newsom.117
A. Areas of Disagreement Among Lower Courts
This part reviews the circuit split surrounding the scope of the
Meyer-Pierce right. It then discusses the circuit split surrounding the proper
level of scrutiny state actions abridging the Meyer-Pierce right must be
subject to.

107. Id. at 61.
108. Id. at 71.
109. Id. at 65 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)).
110. See id. at 67.
111. Id. at 72–73.
112. The plurality in Troxel used a combination of factors test and concluded that the lower
court impermissibly supplanted its own view of the child’s best interests for that of the parents.
See id.
113. See id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. See id. at 95–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). “[C]ourts must use considerable restraint,
including careful adherence to the incremental instruction given by the precise facts of
particular cases, as they seek to give further and more precise definition to the [Meyer-Pierce]
right.” Id.
115. See infra Part II.A.1.
116. See infra Part II.A.2.
117. 6 F.4th 904 (9th Cir. 2021).
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1. The Scope of the Meyer-Pierce Right
Since Troxel, a split has developed among courts regarding the scope of
parental rights. Fields v. Palmdale School District118 and C.N. v. Ridgewood
Board of Education119 represent the competing views.
In the early 2000s, the Palmdale School District in California approved the
administration of a survey of elementary school students to learn about
childhood trauma.120 Several questions involved sexual content, and while
parental consent was solicited, parents were not informed of the survey’s
sexual content.121 Some parents sued on Meyer-Pierce grounds, noting that
they would not have consented to the survey had they known their children
would be exposed to sexual topics.122 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.123
The court noted that while the Meyer-Pierce right was fundamental, it was
not absolute.124 The court stated that the Meyer-Pierce right merely protects
parents’ ability to choose where to educate their children.125 Once parents
exercise that choice, the court held, their Meyer-Pierce right is “substantially
diminished.”126 Because the survey did not interfere with parents’ choice of
forum, the court found no fundamental right implicated, applied rational
basis review, and held for the state.127
While the outcome in Fields is consistent with other jurisdictions’
treatment of parental rights in the public school context,128 some scholars
118. 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
119. 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
120. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1200.
121. Id. at 1201.
122. Id. at 1202.
123. Id. at 1207.
124. Id. at 1204. The court cited a variety of cases, including Pierce, to support the notion
that parental interests are subject to “reasonable” regulation. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 1206.
127. Id. at 1208.
128. See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
no parental right to exempt one’s child from the school district’s dress code); Littlefield v.
Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that parents have no
“fundamental right . . . to control the clothing their children wear to public schools”);
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding rational basis
review to be the appropriate standard for Meyer-Pierce claims and finding the public school
district’s community service requirement to be constitutional); Herndon by Herndon v. Chapel
Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ. 89 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that rational
basis review is the proper standard for Meyer-Pierce claims and finding the school district’s
community service requirement to be constitutional); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc.,
68 F.3d 525, 533–34 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding no right on the part of public school parents to
“dictate individually what the schools teach their children”). But see Gruenke v. Seip, 225
F.3d 290, 305 (3rd Cir. 2000) (finding parental rights violated and requiring a “compelling
interest” to justify the violation when a coach became involved in a teen student’s pregnancy
and neglected to involve the parents); Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia Cnty., Ala., 880
F.2d 305, 313–14 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding a violation of parental rights where a school
counselor coerced a student into obtaining an abortion and encouraged the student not to
discuss it with her parents); Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265–67 (App. Div.
1993) (finding the condom distribution component of HIV health instruction to infringe on
parental rights).
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have taken issue with this reading of the right as a general matter.129
Professor Kathleen Conn notes that Meyer and Pierce afford parents not just
the right to choose where to educate their children but also to choose “what
kind of instruction [they] receive.”130 To Conn, the dispositive element in
Fields was the fact that the parents were challenging the administration of
public schools,131 not, as the Fields court stated, that the Meyer-Pierce right
is generally limited to the choice of educational forum.132 However, Conn
also lends some support to Fields’s formulation of parental rights, even in
the private school setting, by noting that parents exercise their interest in the
substance of their children’s education by selecting which private schools to
send their children to.133
Nonetheless, at least one court has expressly rejected Fields’s
interpretation of parental rights. In Ridgewood, parents alleged their
Meyer-Pierce right was violated by the administration of a survey containing
information they wished to shield their children from.134 The parents
claimed that they were not apprised of the survey’s content and were thus
prevented from deciding whether to allow their children to participate.135
The Third Circuit in Ridgewood also noted that the Meyer-Pierce right was
fundamental but not absolute.136 Among its limitations, the court noted, was
the inability of parents to control the administration of public schools.137
However, the court made one caveat: when schools usurp control over
matters that “strike at the heart of parental decision-making,” parental rights
may prevail.138 Though the court did not elaborate on what precisely those
matters might be, the court ultimately held that the survey did not violate the
parents’ rights because it did not entirely prevent them from contextualizing
the information for their children in a way that comported with their
129. See, e.g., Kathleen Conn, Parents’ Right to Direct Their Children’s Education and
Student Sex Surveys, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 139, 146–47 (2009); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court
and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 101, 157–58 (2000) (noting that parents have a protected
interest in what transpires in private schools); see also Saiger, supra note 69, at 51; TRIBE,
supra note 46, § 15-6, at 1319; Elliott M. Davis, Unjustly Usurping the Parental Right: Fields
v. Palmdale School District, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1133,
1141 (2006) (rejecting the approach in Fields).
130. Conn, supra note 129, at 146–47 (noting that parents have an interest in what their
children learn and how their children are instructed).
131. See id. at 147–49 (noting that the Meyer-Pierce right does not afford parents control
over the administration of public schools).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 147. This view, however, does not address the degree to which the state
may regulate the substance of private schooling. See Ryan, supra note 129, at 158 (noting that
if Meyer and Pierce only protect parents’ ability to choose private school, “the right to attend
a private school would be an empty shell”); see also Saiger, supra note 69, at 51–52
(explaining that state regulations cannot be such that private schools are effectively required
to operate as public schools).
134. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2005). The survey
contained information relating to drug and alcohol abuse, sex, and suicide. See id. at 163.
135. Id. at 184–85.
136. Id. at 182–83.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 184.
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values.139 In doing so, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the approach in
Fields in exchange for a more flexible understanding of the Meyer-Pierce
right’s scope.140
2. The Level of Protection the Meyer-Pierce Right Demands
A circuit split has also developed around what level of scrutiny to apply to
abridgments of parents’ Meyer-Pierce right. Representing the competing
views are Immediato v. Rye Neck School District141 and Circle School v.
Phillips.142
In Immediato, parents challenged the mandatory community service
requirement of New York’s Rye Neck Public School District, which required
high school students to complete forty hours of community service to receive
their diplomas.143
The Immediatos (the parents) alleged that the
Meyer-Pierce right encompassed the ability of parents to exempt their
children from the school’s community service requirement.144
The Second Circuit found that the parents had a “cognizable” right to direct
the upbringing of their children under the Due Process Clause145 but noted
that it was not yet clear what level of scrutiny the right compels.146 To
resolve this, the court emphasized that Meyer, Pierce, Yoder, and Runyon all
used the language of reasonableness with respect to secular parental
interests.147 From this, the court concluded that where parents assert an
infringement of their Meyer-Pierce right on the basis of secular interests, the
state action need only satisfy rational basis review.148
While Immediato found support for rational basis review in the language
of reasonableness, some scholars believe that the Meyer-Pierce “reasonable
relation” test is distinct because, unlike rational basis review, it appears to
afford little deference to the state.149
139. Id. at 185.
140. See id. at 185 n.26; see also Davis, supra note 129, at 1141 (describing the Fields
approach as a “bright-line rule” and contrasting it with Ridgewood’s “less predictable” and
more “nuanced” understanding of parental rights).
141. 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996).
142. 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Circle Sch. v.
Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 183 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir.
2000) (applying strict scrutiny to a violation of parents’ Meyer-Pierce right).
143. Immediato, 73 F.3d at 458.
144. Id. at 461.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 462.
149. See Maxine Eichner, School Surveys and Children’s Education: The Argument for
Shared Authority Between Parents and the State, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 459, 468 (2009) (noting that
Meyer and Pierce gave more “teeth” in their scrutiny of the state action than courts otherwise
give today under rational basis review); see also Jon S. Lerner, Comment, Protecting Home
Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 372–73 (1995)
(noting that the Meyer-Pierce test, contrary to the modern framework, does not defer to the
state as does rational basis review). The modern rational basis test, as employed by courts,
contrary to the test applied in Meyer and Pierce, affords nearly complete deference to the state.
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Some have also argued that Yoder improperly truncated the Meyer-Pierce
right.150 James Mason, for example, notes that Pierce included both secular
and parochial schools and that the Pierce Court afforded parents of both
schools the same level of protection.151 Accordingly, some have instead read
Yoder as a Free Exercise case, rather than a parental due process case, thereby
nullifying the application of Yoder’s secular-religious distinction for parental
rights.152
In contrast to Immediato, some courts have found that strict scrutiny
applies to Meyer-Pierce claims. In Circle School, Pennsylvania enacted a
law153 mandating that private schools display the American flag and begin
each school day with a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.154 A number
of parents from different private schools sued, alleging that the law promoted

See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (finding that statutes being
scrutinized under rational basis review “bear[] a strong presumption of validity”); see also
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational Basis and the Right to Be Free of Arbitrary Legislation,
14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 494 (2016) (stating that “because the modern rational basis
test operates on the basis of what the legislature ‘could have thought,’ without regard to what
the legislature’s actual purpose was . . . it is the judicial equivalent of no test at all” and stating
that nearly all legislation can survive rational basis review); TRIBE, supra note 46, § 16-3, at
1443 (describing rational basis review as equivalent to a “strong presumption of
constitutionality” in favor of the state); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) (describing rational basis review as “minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact”). But see generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (affording no presumption
of constitutionality to Nebraska’s law); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(affording no presumption of constitutionality to Oregon’s law); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284 (1927) (affording no presumption of constitutionality to Hawaii’s law). Judged by
their outcomes, Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington bear more relation to cases employing strict
scrutiny than those employing rational basis review. See Jackson, supra, at 511–12; Gilles,
supra note 90, at 1005–06 (reasoning that courts have improperly found rational basis review
to govern Meyer-Pierce claims); see also Gunther, supra, at 8 (describing strict scrutiny as
“strict in theory and fatal in fact”).
150. See James R. Mason, III, Comment, Smith’s Free-Exercise “Hybrids” Rooted in
Non-Free-Exercise Soil, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 201, 253 (1995) (noting that if Pierce did stand
for the proposition that secular interests received no constitutional protection, then its principle
would need to be restated); see also TRIBE, supra note 46, § 15-6, at 1318 n.3 (noting that the
presence of Hill Military Academy as a party “mak[es] it clear that Pierce was not merely a
free exercise holding”).
151. See Mason, supra note 150, at 253. Indeed, the Knights of Columbus underwrote Hill
Military Academy’s involvement in Pierce “to ensure that a nonparochial school was
represented.” See William Cornett & Kenneth R. Coleman, Hill Military Academy, OR.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(emphasis
added),
https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/
hill_military_academy/#.Yes5BVjMIUp [https://perma.cc/S5EN-S6GL] (Mar. 17, 2018); see
also PAULA ABRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER
COMPULSORY PUBLIC EDUCATION 130 (2009) (noting that Hill Military Academy was added
to the Pierce complaint to ensure that a nonsectarian school was represented).
152. See Gilles, supra note 90, at 1009–12 (analyzing Wisconsin v. Yoder as a case using
the Free Exercise clause as a source of parental rights, rather than a limitation); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566–67 n.4 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (noting that Yoder should be understood as a Free Exercise case, not a parental
rights case).
153. 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 7-771 (West 2022) (effective Feb. 7, 2003).
154. Id. § 7-771(c)(1).
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values adverse to those they wished for their children to learn in private
school.155
Judge Robert Kelly of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that the
parents had a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.156
From this, Judge Kelly concluded that the law must be subject to strict
scrutiny.157 On appeal, the Third Circuit left the district court’s reasoning
intact.158
Scholars largely agree that the splits seen in Immediato, Circle School,
Fields, and Ridgewood have emerged because Meyer and Pierce are
“product[s] of [their] time”159 and do not fit neatly within the modern
framework.160 Professor Margaret Ryznar argues that the complexity of
parental rights and the unique public and private interests they give rise to is
largely to blame for this.161 Indeed, Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting in
Troxel, acknowledged the complexity of parental rights by noting that they
give rise to different sets of constitutional principles in the “schooling
context” than they do in other contexts.162 For instance, the “schooling
155. Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d. 616, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 183 (3d Cir. 2004). The Third Circuit
declined to address Judge Kelly’s parental rights reasoning because it had already concluded
that the act was unconstitutional on other grounds. Id.
159. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L. REV. 127, 144
(2018).
160. Id.; see also Gilles, supra note 90, at 1005–07 (noting that Meyer and Pierce’s concept
of “reasonableness” is distinct from the way modern courts interpret it); Meyer, supra note
13, at 561–64 (noting that the Court’s current approach to handling Meyer-Pierce claims
trends away from rigid reference to historical practice and tiered scrutiny analysis toward a
more balanced approach leaving behind a “fundamental right whose boundaries are . . .
tortuous and bizarre”); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions
and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV 989, 1035 (1991) (noting that contrary to the modern
framework, Meyer and Pierce were “predicated on limits to the use of governmental force,
even when deployed to promote objectives within the government’s legitimate authority”).
Professor McConnell notes that Meyer, for example, does not suggest that regulating language
instruction is beyond the power of the state, whereas a case like Roe v. Wade is predicated on
the government’s inability to regulate abortion. Id. at 1035–36. Supporting McConnell’s
thesis, Jon Lerner notes that the Meyer-Pierce analysis is outcome-based, rather than
input-based. See Lerner, supra note 149, at 376. In other words, the state’s interest in
education does not revolve around the substantive content within schools but rather ensuring
that the content provides children with a sufficient education. See id.
161. See Ryznar, supra note 159, at 146.
162. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86 n.7 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
ABRAMS, supra note 151, at 230–31 (explaining that Pierce provides little guidance in familial
relations cases); Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1354 (1980) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Family] (positing that because
the interests of both children and society can weigh against parental rights to varying degrees,
“[p]arental rights . . . deserve different degrees of constitutional protection in different
circumstances”). The Court also interprets Meyer and Pierce as creating a right to “familial
privacy.” See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding a “private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)
(“[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure
of our society.” (emphasis added)); see also Emily J. Brown, Note, When Insiders Become
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context,” unlike the “family law visitation context” does not necessarily
implicate the competing interests of various parties.163 Rather, the schooling
context involves a “bipolar struggle” over whose authority—parents’ or the
state’s—should govern children’s education.164 Yet even within the
schooling context, some note that the constitutional analysis of parental
rights in the public school context is different than the private school
context.165 The crux of the issue, to Ryznar, is that it is not always clear
which specific parental rights are entitled to strict scrutiny.166
To resolve this, Ryznar calls for a detangling of parental rights into distinct
elements: (1) care, (2) custody, and (3) control, with each element
commanding a different level of scrutiny depending on how related to the

Outsiders: Parental Objections to Public School Sex Education Programs, 59 DUKE L.J. 109,
121 (2009) (discussing a successful parental rights case against a public school, Gruenke v.
Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2000), and noting that the court placed great emphasis on the
state’s deprivation of parents’ ability to handle family matters discretely and internally). The
Court has signaled that the interests in familial privacy and in the direction of children’s
education are analytically distinct. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176–80 (1976)
(analyzing the Meyer-Pierce claim under two distinct categories: (1) parental rights and (2)
the right to privacy). Notably, Runyon stated that a “person’s decision . . . concerning the
manner in which his child is to be educated may fairly be characterized as [an] exercise[] of
familial rights and responsibilities.” Id. at 178. However, courts have yet to universally
analyze parental interests in education this way. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427
F.3d 1197, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2005) (analyzing the Meyer-Pierce claim and familial privacy
claim separately but noting that courts have construed the rights as “one and the same”).
163. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 86.
165. See Conn, supra note 129, at 147–49 (noting that when parents enroll their children in
public school, the “calculus changes” with respect to constitutional protection of their parental
interests). Indeed, when public school parents level Meyer-Pierce challenges against school
policy, in addition to generally finding such claims outside the scope of the Meyer-Pierce
right, courts also weigh the interests of school districts against parental rights—something
they do not do in the private school context. Compare Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206 (weighing the
interests of public schools against parental rights), with Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp.
2d. 616, 626–27 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (neglecting to weigh the interests of the state against parental
rights). For example, courts note that school districts may act as parens patriae to promote
children’s welfare in deciding, over parental objections, what kind of material should be
incorporated into the school curriculum. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 129, at 1138; see also
Fields, 427 F.3d at 1204. Parens patriae is a doctrine used to protect children from the harmful
decisions or conduct of their parents. See The Constitution and the Family, supra note 162, at
1221. Additionally, courts also take note of the administrative difficulties public schools
would face if they had to cater a curriculum to children based on the idiosyncratic views of
their parents. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir.
1995) (noting that if parents had constitutional rights to control how schools educated their
children, “the schools would be forced to cater a curriculum” for each student whose parents
disagreed with the school’s curriculum); see also Davis, supra note 129, at 1133–34
(explaining that some courts have noted the administrative burden schools would face if public
school parents’ interests received heightened protection by the courts). And, courts note,
Pierce’s proclamation that the state may not “standardize” children is inapplicable in the
public school context because parents have implicitly accepted the type of education provided
at public schools by voluntarily sending their children to them rather than to private schools.
See, e.g., Brown, 68 F.3d at 533 (limiting the Meyer-Pierce right because parents had “chosen”
to send their children to public school).
166. See Ryznar, supra note 159, at 147–48.
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“core of parenting” it is.167 Under Ryznar’s framework, state actions
abridging parental “control” (i.e. the Meyer-Pierce right) would receive
rational basis review because this parental interest is the “least weighty.”168
However, some scholars argue that parents are in a better position, and
possess greater incentives, than the state to provide their children with a
proper education.169 As such, these scholars argue parents’ control over their
children’s education deserves robust protection against state action.170
B. The Right of Parents to Select Private Schools Providing In-Person
Instruction During the COVID-19 Pandemic
This section will provide background information on the COVID-19
pandemic, the school closures employed by states to curb it, and concerns
surrounding the effects of school closures on children. This section will then
discuss a recent successful Meyer-Pierce challenge to California’s school
closures.
1. The Evolving COVID-19 Pandemic and Concerns Surrounding School
Closures
In December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) learned that
patients in Wuhan, China, were suffering from a “viral pneumonia” of an
“unknown cause”—later designated as COVID-19.171 By January 2020, it
was clear that the disease was transmitting from human to human172 and on
March 13, 2020, then President Donald J. Trump declared a national
emergency to cull the spread of the disease.173 The Trump administration
also issued guidance recommending that governors close schools to prevent
community spread.174 Following this guidance, every state and territory took
167. See id. at 147–49.
168. Id. at 154.
169. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 90, at 951–55; Eichner, supra note 149, at 465–66
(expressing the need for a framework that does not usurp the important role parents play in
their children’s education); see also Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing
Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1429–31 (2020).
170. See Gilles, supra note 90, at 951–55; Eichner, supra note 149, at 465–71; Huntington
& Scott, supra note 169, at 1429–31 (noting that parental decision-making should be protected
by courts because parents are generally best positioned to guide their children’s education).
171. Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan 29, 2021),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/4F8U-LLTE].
172. Id.
173. Andrew Resuccia et al., Trump Declares National Emergency to Confront
Coronavirus, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2020, 6:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
coronavirus-strikes-key-figures-in-politics-sports-as-infections-spread-globally11584093470 [https://perma.cc/67JJ-XYVS].
174. See THE WHITE HOUSE, 15 DAYS TO SLOW THE SPREAD (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread/ [https://perma.cc/D2KZHFEQ]; THE PRESIDENT’S CORONAVIRUS GUIDELINES FOR AMERICA: 15 DAYS TO SLOW THE
SPREAD, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2020), https://www.justice.gov/doj/
page/file/1258511/download [https://perma.cc/WX9V-3UXC]. Despite the Trump
administration’s recommendations, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
coterminously noted that mitigation measures may more efficaciously limit the spread of
COVID-19 than outright school closures, both short-term and long-term. See CTRS. FOR
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some action to close schools, though the responses between states differed.175
With in-person instruction restricted, educators shifted to virtual and other
forms of distance learning.176 However, as school closures persisted, parents
have expressed concern and frustration over distance learning.177
The shift to virtual learning has raised several concerns. First, many worry
that the virtual mode provides an inferior educational experience than
traditional in-person instruction.178 Indeed, year-over-year comparisons

DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CONSIDERATIONS FOR SCHOOL CLOSURE (2020),
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85832 [https://perma.cc/K7KB-523F].
175. See Jim Alrutz, Legislative Update: Early State and Federal Response to
Coronavirus-Related School Closures, 40 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 146, 146–47 (2020).
176. NEAL MCCLUSKEY, CATO INST., PRIVATE SCHOOLING AFTER A YEAR OF COVID-19:
HOW THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAS FARED AND HOW TO KEEP IT HEALTHY 2 (2021).
177. See Michael B. Henderson et al., Pandemic Parent Survey Finds Perverse Pattern:
Students Are More Likely to Be Attending School in Person Where COVID Is Spreading More
Rapidly, 21 EDUC. NEXT, no. 2, 2020, at 34, https://www.educationnext.org/pandemic-parentsurvey-finds-perverse-pattern-students-more-likely-to-be-attending-school-in-person-wherecovid-is-spreading-more-rapidly/ [https://perma.cc/JSV6-N84M] (determining that parents
whose children were learning virtually were less satisfied and more likely to report adverse
physical and psychological outcomes for their children than were their in-person
counterparts); see also Christina Rexrode & Lauren Weber, Working Parents Are Hitting
Their Coronavirus Breaking Point—and Paying for It, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/working-parents-are-hitting-their-coronavirus-breakingpointand-paying-for-it-11597483801 [https://perma.cc/4QQC-GJPE]; Ashley Fetters Maloy,
Distance Learning Is Straining Parent-Teacher Relationships, WASH. POST
(Nov. 12, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2020/11/12/parentteacher-relationships-covid/ [https://perma.cc/UC73-TW79]; Karen D’Souza, Distance
Learning Stokes Fears of Excessive Screen Time, EDSOURCE (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://edsource.org/2020/distance-learning-stokes-fears-of-excessive-screen-time/644165
[https://perma.cc/VS2T-5CS4].
178. Susanna Loeb, Opinion, How Effective Is Online Learning?: What the Research Does
and Doesn’t Tell Us, EDWEEK (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/technology/opinionhow-effective-is-online-learning-what-the-research-does-and-doesnt-tell-us/2020/03
[https://perma.cc/FP2n-PWG7] (“In comparisons of online and in-person classes . . . online
classes aren’t as effective as in-person classes for most students.”); EMMA DORN ET AL.,
MCKINSEY & CO., COVID-19 AND STUDENT LEARNING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE HURT
COULD LAST A LIFETIME 3 (2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-socialsector/our-insights/covid-19-and-student-learning-in-the-united-states-the-hurt-could-last-alifetime# [https://perma.cc/E29W-5UUT] (noting that while the best online schools available
may produce an equivalent education to traditional schools, “most studies have found that
full-time online learning does not deliver the academic results of in-class instruction”); Jeremy
N. Bailenson, Nonverbal Overload: A Theoretical Argument for the Causes of Zoom Fatigue,
AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, Feb. 23, 2021, at 1, https://doi.org/10.1037/tmb0000030
[https://perma.cc/36UL-KRWV] (discussing possible underlying causes of the phenomenon
of “Zoom fatigue” experienced by many using the virtual platform “Zoom” for online learning
and videoconferencing); see also Preparing K–12 School Administrator for a Safe Return to
School in Fall 2020, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 26, 2020) [hereinafter
C.D.C.
Guidance],
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/schoolschildcare/prepare-safe-return.html [https://perma.cc/GNM8-X6AF] (noting that in-person
instruction offers many advantages over virtual learning, including greater teacher
involvement in learning and more interpersonal interaction among students, their teachers, and
their peers); Sébastien Goudeau et al., Why Lockdown and Distance Learning During the
COVID-19 Pandemic Are Likely to Increase the Social Class Achievement Gap, 5 NATURE
HUM.
BEHAV.
1273
(2021),
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01212-7
[https://perma.cc/5RAM-NQPB] (noting that the shift to virtual learning has made education

1838

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

indicate that students made smaller academic gains in fall 2020,179 when
most schools were operating remotely.180 By year’s end, learning gains in
the 2020–2021 school year still lagged behind those in years past.181
Responding to weaker academic gains, some teachers have reported that a
return to in-person learning will help students catch up.182 Second, data
suggest that school closures have negatively impacted children’s mental
health, making online learning particularly difficult.183 Third, some argue
that school closures will negatively impact the future economic output and
financial position of students affected by the closures.184 Fourth, while early
data and expert guidance left states with conflicting messages about the need
to close schools,185 evidence has mounted that wholesale closures may not
be necessary in all circumstances to curb the spread of COVID-19. For one,
studies have demonstrated that while children spread the virus at rates
comparable to the rates at which adults spread the virus,186 the risk posed to
children by COVID-19 is low187 and transmission in school settings is
controllable when proper mitigation measures are in place.188 Additionally,
at least in counties where hospitalization rates are below 36 to 44
hospitalizations per 100,000 people per week, data suggest that school
more reliant on parental engagement given the limited control teachers are able to maintain
over the virtual classroom).
179. Henderson et al., supra note 177.
180. See MEGAN KUHFELD ET AL., NWEA RSCH., LEARNING DURING COVID-19: INITIAL
FINDINGS ON STUDENTS’ READING AND MATH ACHIEVEMENT AND GROWTH 3–4 (2020),
https://www.nwea.org/content/uploads/2020/11/Collaborative-brief-Learning-duringCOVID-19.NOV2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4WA-4CKZ].
181. RENAISSANCE LEARNING, HOW ARE KIDS PERFORMING: TRACKING THE SCHOOL-YEAR
IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON READING AND MATHEMATICS ACHIEVEMENT 8 (2021).
182. HORACE MANN, CLOSING THE LEARNING GAP: HOW FRONTLINE EDUCATORS WANT TO
ADDRESS LOST LEARNING DUE TO COVID-19, at 10 (2021).
183. See DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 6, at 2–3.
184. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., FUTURE OUTPUT LOSS FROM COVID-INDUCED
SCHOOL CLOSURES 2–4 (2021), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2021-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8RZ-JMWD]. School closures may have caused a reduction of
college-educated workers by roughly 3 percent in 2045, contributing to what is estimated to
be a $150 billion reduction in economic output by 2045. Id. at 3–4; see also DORN ET AL.,
supra note 178, at 6–8. Learning loss resulting from school closures may result in “the
equivalent of a year of full-time work.” Id. at 7. “With lower levels of learning and higher
numbers of drop-outs, students affected by COVID-19 will probably be less skilled and
therefore less productive than students from generations that did not experience a similar gap
in learning.” Id. at 7.
185. See Erica L. Green, Administration Offers Guidance to Schools as They Shut Down
on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/politics/
virus-school-closings-education.html [https://perma.cc/QEC3-FZUN] (noting the conflicting
messages from experts surrounding the efficacy and necessity of school closures).
186. See Science Brief: Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in K–12 Schools and Early Care and
FOR
Education
Programs,
CTRS.
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/science-briefs/
transmission_k_12_schools.html [https://perma.cc/9JEJ-PBLS]. However, transmission
between children is rare. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. (“The majority of cases that are acquired in the community and are brought
into a school setting result in limited spread inside schools when multiple layered prevention
strategies are in place.”).

2022]

SCHOOL CLOSURES AND PARENTAL CONTROL

1839

reopenings present limited risk of increasing hospitalizations.189 Indeed, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention acknowledged that schools could
reopen safely as early as fall 2020 with proper mitigation measures in
place.190
With these concerns in mind, and with school closures in some areas
lasting through spring 2021, parents have looked to the courts for relief from
COVID-19 related school closures.191
2. Brach v. Newsom: Parents’ Legal Challenge to California’s School
Closures
In March 2020, California Governor Gavin Newsom issued an executive
order192 instructing citizens to “immediately heed the current [s]tate public
health directives.”193 Concurrently, the state public health officer issued a
directive requiring residents to shelter in place.194 Between July 2020 and
June 2021, periodically revised guidance allowed schools to reopen based on
their respective county’s positive COVID-19 test rates.195 Over a year into
the pandemic, Governor Newsom formally revoked the aforementioned
stay-at-home order and public health guidance as to businesses and other

189. See DOUGLAS N. HARRIS ET AL., EFFECTS OF SCHOOL REOPENINGS ON COVID-19
HOSPITALIZATIONS 1 (2021). Using hospitalizations as a metric for determining the relative
safety of in-person activity is also unlikely to be affected by whether schools reopen or not,
unlike COVID-19 test positivity rates. Id. at 4. Moreover, the effect of transmission, reflected
in positive tests results, does not necessarily translate into negative health outcomes. Id.
190. See C.D.C. Guidance, supra note 178.
191. As of spring 2022, data indicate that around 99 percent of school districts are operating
in person. See School Learning Modalities, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2022),
https://protect-public.hhs.gov/pages/learning-modalities
[https://perma.cc/7CSZ-V932].
However, periodic school closures have nonetheless persisted throughout the 2021–2022
school year in part due to the surge of the Omicron variant. See Burbio’s K-12 School Opening
Tracker, BURBIO (Feb. 11, 2022, 6:30 PM), https://cai.burbio.com/school-opening-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/4A68-GZS4].
192. See Cal. Exec. Order No. N-33-20 (2020).
193. Id.
194. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, ORDER OF THE STATE PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER:
MARCH
19,
2020
(2020),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/
CDPH%20Document%20Library/COVID-19/Health%20Order%203.19.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67TW-SHH9].
195. See Guidance from Cal. Dep’t of Pub. Health on COVID-19 and Reopening In-Person
Instruction Framework & Public Health Guidance for K–12 Schools in California, 2020–2021
School Year (June 4, 2021), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID19/COVID19-K12-Schools-InPerson-Instruction.aspx [https://perma.cc/KZ7E-5JX4]. The
guidance first released on July 17, 2020, has since been revised, with the last update occurring
on June 4, 2021. See id. Initial guidance permitted reopening only if counties’ positive test
rates fell below seven per 100,000 people per day. See Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904, 911–
15 (9th Cir.), vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.); see also CAL. DEP’T OF PUB.
HEALTH, ORDER OF THE STATE PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER: AUGUST 28, 2020 (2020),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20Document%20Library/COVID19/8-28-20_Order-Plan-Reducing-COVID19-Adjusting-Permitted-Sectors-Signed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L79Q-2B67]. As revised, the guidance eventually increased the reopening
threshold to twenty-five per 100,000 people per day. See Guidance from Cal. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, supra; see also Brach, 6 F.4th at 914.
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in-person activities.196 However, the state public health officer preserved the
guidance as to school reopenings through a contemporaneous order.197
These orders effectively prevented some parents from obtaining in-person
private school instruction for their children, as desired, for upwards of one
year.198
In Brach v. Newsom, fourteen parents from both public and private schools
challenged California’s reopening framework on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, claiming that the state had violated their parental rights.199 The
district court denied plaintiffs’ application to enjoin the reopening
restrictions, and the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.200
In their reply brief, the appellants analogized their case to Meyer, arguing
that the prohibition of in-person education was akin to the prohibition of
German language instruction.201 According to appellants, Meyer and Pierce
protected parents’ right to choose a particular educational program and the
prohibition of in-person education prevented them from exercising this
right.202
The state disagreed and, relying on Fields, argued that the Meyer-Pierce
right was limited to parents’ choice of educational forum.203 Under the
state’s reading, Meyer and Pierce did not protect parents’ ability to choose a
school offering a desired mode of instruction.204 Accordingly, as the orders
did not prevent appellants from choosing to send their children to private
schools, the state argued that the guidance did not abridge appellants’
Meyer-Pierce right.205
In a since-vacated 2–1 majority opinion, the Ninth Circuit held for the
parents.206 The court began by noting that the Meyer-Pierce right must be

196. See Cal. Exec. Order No. N-07-21 (2021) (rescinding the restrictions for “businesses
and activities” but preserving the authority of the state public health officer to impose public
health mandates).
197. See CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, ORDER OF THE STATE PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER: JUNE
11, 2021 (2021), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Orderof-the-State-Public-Health-Officer-Beyond-Blueprint.aspx [https://perma.cc/BL8L-QZFF]
(preserving the restrictions as to schools).
198. Brach, 6 F.4th at 932–33 (noting that the state’s school closures for some plaintiffs
lasted nearly a year); see also Howard Blume, LAUSD to Fully Reopen Schools in the Fall
Plus Offer an Online Option, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2021, 8:49 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/California/story/2021-05-24/post-covid-lausd-fully-reopenschools-in-the-fall [https://perma.cc/3K93-WUBU].
199. First Amended Complaint at 31, Brach v. Newsom, No. 20-cv-06472 (C.D. Cal. July
29, 2020).
200. See Brach, 6 F.4th at 909–10.
201. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21, Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904 (9th Cir.
2021) (No. 20–56291).
202. See id. at 21.
203. See Appellees’ Answering Brief at 37–38, Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904 (9th Cir.
2021) (No. 20–56921).
204. See id.
205. See id. at 38.
206. See Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904, 928 (9th Cir. 2021). The court did not address
any Meyer-Pierce interest as to the public school parents. Id.
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narrowly interpreted.207 Accordingly, the court proceeded under the modern
framework by granularly defining the asserted parental interest as the right
to choose in-person education.208 However, the court did not attempt to
determine whether the right to choose in-person education itself was a
fundamental right, as would have been its task under the modern
framework.209 Instead, the court asked whether the interest would have
fallen within the scope of those interests protected in Meyer and Pierce.210
As such, the court held that the state’s interpretation of the right was
“unquestionably too narrow”211 because the original case law not only
protected parents’ ability to choose where to send their children but also
parents’ ability to procure the type of instruction they desired for their
children from schools that, absent regulation, were otherwise willing to offer
such instruction.212 The court further concluded that the Meyer-Pierce right
necessarily encompassed an interest in choosing in-person instruction
because it was the predominant mode of instruction during that era.213
The court also found that the Meyer-Pierce right was “fundamental”214
and noted that regulations abridging fundamental rights are strictly
scrutinized.215 Thus, turning to the question of scrutiny, because the
Meyer-Pierce right encompassed an interest in selecting in-person instruction
and the Meyer-Pierce right was “fundamental,” the court held that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard to review California’s reopening
framework.216
Applying strict scrutiny, the court found that “[s]temming the spread of
COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.”217 However, the court
explained that because the Supreme Court had recently struck down less rigid
COVID-19 restrictions on religious services,218 California’s reopening
framework must be unnecessarily broad because the framework created an
effective attendance cap of zero.219 The court also found that California’s
closures were “more severe” than those in other jurisdictions220 and noted
that the framework was not responsive to evidence of the limited risk posed

207. Id. at 928–29.
208. Id. at 929.
209. See id.; see also supra Part I.
210. See Brach, 6 F.4th at 929 (“Here, a consideration of historical practices and tradition
confirms that California has deprived the private-school Plaintiffs of a core aspect of the
Meyer-Pierce right.” (emphasis added)).
211. Id. at 928.
212. See id. at 928 (noting that the statute struck down in Meyer did more than merely
interfere with parents’ ability to choose private school for their children).
213. See id. at 929.
214. See id. at 931 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. Id. (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020)).
218. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 63 (enjoining New York’s
numerical attendance caps on religious services).
219. See Brach, 6 F.4th at 931.
220. See id. at 932.
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to children by the virus.221 The court found the record sufficient to justify a
variety of mitigation requirements within schools but insufficient to justify
“wholesale closure.”222 Finally, the court noted that the state failed to show
why it preserved the restrictions on in-person education while permitting
other congregative activities to carry on.223 Consequently, the court found
that it could not conclude that California’s reopening framework satisfied
strict scrutiny.224 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.225
Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz dissented.226 Judge Hurwitz began by
chastising the majority for what he saw as its overbroad reading of Pierce.227
According to Judge Hurwitz, the Meyer-Pierce right only protected parents’
choice of educational forum and California’s reopening framework did not
encumber that interest.228 Judge Hurwitz also argued that the majority
erroneously concluded that strict scrutiny applied.229 In his view, the only
question courts must ask is whether the regulation is “reasonable.”230 He
noted further that, of the Supreme Court justices, only Justice Thomas has
stated that abridgements of the Meyer-Pierce right should be subject to strict
scrutiny.231 Accordingly, in Judge Hurwitz’s view, even regulations
abridging parents’ Meyer-Pierce right should be able to survive so long as
they are “reasonable.”232
Finally, Judge Hurwitz argued that given the context of the pandemic, the
court should have been “particularly deferential.”233 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized that states must have significant latitude to act “in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.”234 Still, the Court has

221. Id. According to the court, the state’s only response was to highlight that
asymptomatic transmission was possible in school settings. Id. But see supra Part II.B.1
(discussing the limited risks posed by the virus to children and the limited rates of transmission
in school settings when mitigation measures are in place).
222. Brach, 6 F.4th at 932.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 933–34.
225. See id. at 934.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 944 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court instructed for a
narrow reading of Pierce and that such a reading does not include the right of parents to choose
a particular mode of education).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 945. Judge Hurwitz argued that the majority ignored controlling precedent
suggesting that the Meyer-Pierce right was subject to reasonable regulation. Id.; cf., e.g.,
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (holding that parents’ Meyer-Pierce interests
are still subject to “reasonable” regulation).
230. Brach, 6 F.4th at 945 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting) (“If every regulation touching on a
Meyer-Pierce interest must survive [strict scrutiny], a host of ‘reasonable’ regulations would
not survive . . . .”).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–15
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427
(1974)).
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signaled that even during a pandemic, individual rights merit relief.235
Scholars, too, dispute that the law requires abandoning tiered scrutiny during
public health crises in favor of deference to the state.236 To them, the modern
framework is calibrated to properly balance the interests of the state and
individuals, and hence, courts need not exercise greater deference.237
III. RESOLVING THE INCONSISTENT MEYER-PIERCE ANALYSIS AMONG
COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SCHOOL CLOSURES
The fractured Brach opinion, its subsequent vacatur, and the split among
circuits demonstrate the need for a consistent framework for analyzing
Meyer-Pierce claims. This part resolves the conflict among courts by
articulating a standard for analyzing Meyer-Pierce claims built upon the
foundation of the case law and the modern framework’s interest in curbing
judicial activism. Applying this test to school closures, this Note argues that,
in certain circumstances, the closure of private schools may be
unconstitutional.
A. The Appropriate Constitutional Analysis of Meyer-Pierce Claims
The primary difficulty courts face when analyzing Meyer-Pierce claims is
how to interpret the right under the modern framework. Some courts forego
any analysis into whether the particularized interest is fundamental,238
implicitly adopting a broad formulation of parental rights. Other courts ask
whether the particularized interest is of the kind the original case law would
have protected.239

235. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020) (“[E]ven in a
pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.”).
236. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Michelle Goodwin, Civil Liberties in a Pandemic:
The Lessons of History, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 815, 834–36 (2021); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Tiered
Scrutiny in a Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 39, 43 (2020). Others argue that at the outset of
crises, the judiciary should exercise greater deference, but as the “emerging crisis” becomes a
“managed and regulated one,” that deference should cease. See David K. Thomson,
Constitutional Long Haulers: The Undiagnosed Long-Term Impact of Judicial Review on
Emergency Public Health Orders, 60 JUDGES’ J., no. 3, 2021, at 6, 7. This view also seems
consistent with the Court’s treatment of recent public health orders relating to COVID-19.
Compare S. Bay United Pentecostal, 140 S. Ct. at 1613–14 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(exercising greater deference early in the pandemic), with Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn,
141 S. Ct. at 68 (affording no deference to the state and applying strict scrutiny later in the
pandemic).
237. See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 236, at 836–38.
238. See Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (neglecting to
analyze whether the parents’ interest in procuring private education to avoid recitation of the
national anthem was “fundamental”); see also Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904, 922 (9th Cir.)
(neglecting to ask whether the particular interest in in-person education was “fundamental”),
vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
239. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005) (asking whether
parents have a right to dictate the curriculum in public schools under Meyer and Pierce, as
opposed to whether their alleged right to do so is “fundamental”); Brach, 6 F.4th at 929 (noting
that the Meyer-Pierce right “necessarily embraced a right to choose in-person private school
instruction”).
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Regardless of why courts are deviating from the modern framework,240
they are right to do so because Meyer and Pierce are products of an entirely
different constitutional analysis.241 The “reasonable relation” test, as applied
in Meyer and Pierce, did not ask which particularized parental interests were
deserving of protection;242 the only question was whether the state’s action
was reasonable.
If it was unreasonable, the regulation was
unconstitutional.243 Thus, unlike the modern framework,244 the “reasonable
relation” test scarcely discriminated between which particular parental
interests were protected under the Constitution and which were not.245
Simply applying one level of scrutiny any time a parent alleges that their
rights have been abridged also does not resolve the conflict noted above. For
example, uniformly applying rational basis review for all Meyer-Pierce
claims, as Professor Ryznar proposes and as Judge Hurwitz suggests, is
inconsistent with the outcomes in the Meyer-Pierce case law because, unlike
rational basis review, the reasonable relation test from Meyer and Pierce
offers no deference to the state.246 By contrast, a default rule of strict scrutiny
would overprotect parental rights because Meyer and Pierce contemplated a
permissible degree of regulation that, even if touching on parents’ ability to
control their children’s education, would nonetheless survive.247
To prevent these inconsistencies, this Note proposes that in determining
whether the Meyer-Pierce right has been abridged, courts must first ask
whether the breadth of the contested state action goes beyond that which was
permitted under Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington instead of asking whether the
particularized interest is “fundamental.” Then, courts must apply the
appropriate level of scrutiny depending on whether the right has been
abridged. This test will promote consistency and judicial economy, while
staying within Justice Kennedy’s cautionary dictate that the Meyer-Pierce
right be interpreted narrowly.248 It will also further the policy goals the
240. For a discussion of possible reasons for the Court’s reluctant interpretation of parental
rights see Ryznar, supra note 159, at 142–46.
241. See id. at 133 (noting that the Court’s parental rights “jurisprudence predates the
current constitutional analytic framework of the various levels of scrutiny”); see also supra
notes 159–65 and accompanying text.
242. Under Meyer and Pierce, the only parental rights that were not protected were those
that were inherently harmful, injurious to the public welfare, or justifiably regulated because
of an emergency. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (noting that no emergency
existed to justify the regulation); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (noting
that the state retains the power to regulate education to the extent that it is “manifestly inimical
to the public welfare” and that the plaintiff schools were not engaged in any activity that was
“inherently harmful”).
243. See McConnell, supra note 160, at 1035; see also Lerner, supra note 149, at 375
(discussing the “reasonable regulation” test from Meyer and Pierce).
244. See supra Part I.A.
245. See McConnell, supra note 160, at 1035 (discussing the contrasting conceptions of
individual rights underlying the “reasonable relation” test and the modern framework).
246. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 77, 86–91 and accompanying text; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 86 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “bipolar struggle” created by Meyer
and Pierce over whose authority should govern children’s education, parents or the state).
248. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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modern framework set out to achieve by helping to curb judicial activism249
and by striking a balance between the interests of the public and individuals.
However, to apply this test, courts must have a clear understanding of what
the Meyer-Pierce right protects and what standard of review to apply when
it has been abridged.
1. The Proper Scope of the Meyer-Pierce Right
Fundamentally, Meyer and Pierce protect pluralism by shielding parental
prerogatives from majoritarian prohibition.250 The cases presume that
parental interests are protected unless they are inherently dangerous, inimical
to the public welfare, or justifiably abridged because of an emergency.251
However, the cases also acknowledge that parental interests are not absolute
and are subject to reasonable regulation. So, when does state action become
unreasonable? Fields essentially posits that only regulations abridging
parents’ ability to send their children to private schools are unreasonable.252
But this is inconsistent with the results in Meyer and Farrington because the
parents in those cases were not prevented from procuring private instruction
per se, but rather from obtaining particular types of instruction.253
Some scholars, like Professor Conn, suggest that the private or public
school context in which the claim arises may be dispositive.254 Yet this
cannot explain why, for example, the parents’ claim in Runyon failed.255
Moreover, this view may underestimate the scope of parental rights in the
context of public schooling.256
The Ninth Circuit panel in Brach suggests that the scope of parental rights
may be assessed by asking whether the asserted interest is analogous to those

249. See Meyer, supra note 13, at 576–77 (noting that a consistent test will help curb the
propensity for judicial activism that the current parental rights jurisprudence enables).
250. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 242.
252. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2005).
253. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.3 (discussing Meyer and Farrington).
254. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
255. If whether the claim arose in the public or private context was dispositive, then
presumably the Court in Runyon v. McCrary would have held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
unreasonably burdened parents’ Meyer-Pierce right. But see 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976)
(finding a law abridging the race-based admissions policies of private schools “reasonable”).
256. See Eichner, supra note 149, at 464 (noting that Conn’s view of parental rights in the
public schools “would give the state too much power over children’s education”); see also
Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265–67 (App. Div. 1993) (finding a public school
condom distribution program in contravention of parents’ Meyer-Pierce right). Admittedly,
Alfonso would probably be decided differently under the framework set forth in this Note
because the condom distribution program did not foreclose the ability of parents to send their
children to alternative educational forums that did not afford their children access to condoms.
See Rodden, supra note 89, at 2173 (noting that the Alfonso court ignored that parents were
not deprived of the ability to seek alternative educational arrangements for their children); see
also infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text. Indeed, when challenging public school
policy, parents face an uphill battle in demonstrating that their Meyer-Pierce right has been
abridged because their claims will likely fail as long as the state has not hobbled their ability
to pursue alternative educational options. See infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text.
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protected in the original case law.257 While this may yield the correct
outcome in some cases, this approach shifts the focus onto the parental
interest and away from the reasonableness of the state action, contrary to the
test outlined in the original case law.258 In doing so, it risks overprotecting
parental rights against otherwise reasonable state regulation simply because
the interest at issue is analogous to those protected in the original cases.259 It
may also, at least in the abstract, underprotect some parental interests not
falling within the scope of the original cases, despite their being unreasonably
regulated.
The Third Circuit in Ridgewood took a different approach. In Ridgewood,
the court held that a state action is unreasonable only when it usurps those
interests that “strike at the heart of parental decision-making.”260 But this
merely adds another interpretive hoop for judges to jump through when
analyzing these claims.
However, beyond Ridgewood’s broad formulation of parental rights, the
court gave some guidance as to their proper scope. The court ultimately held
that the survey at issue did not usurp parental rights because it did not entirely
prevent parents from procuring alternative sources of information for their
children to counter the influence the survey may have had on them.261 This
comports with how scholars have characterized the Meyer-Pierce right’s
scope, noting that the threshold of reasonableness is breached when the state
action completely prevents or substantially hobbles parents’ ability to
procure the educational opportunities they desire for their children.262 Other
courts have also indicated that this is the proper scope of parental rights,263
and this view is consistent with the Meyer-Pierce case law.264 Accordingly,
to determine whether a state action has abridged parents’ Meyer-Pierce right,
257. See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
258. See Lerner, supra note 149, at 376 (noting that Meyer-Pierce’s test scrutinizes the
state’s action and recognizes the state’s regulatory interest as being outcome-oriented, not
input-oriented).
259. See Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904, 945 (9th Cir.) (Hurwitz, J., dissenting) (“If every
regulation touching on a Meyer-Pierce interest must survive [strict scrutiny], a host of
‘reasonable’ regulations would not survive . . . .”), vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir. 2021)
(mem.).
260. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d. Cir. 2005).
261. See id. at 185.
262. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
parental rights do not encompass the ability to direct the administration of public school
curriculum); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that Meyer and Pierce are really about preventing the state from “completely
foreclosing the opportunity of individuals and groups to choose a different path of education”
(emphasis added)).
264. See generally Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (finding a statute that did
not prevent, but severely hobbled, parents’ ability to procure private foreign language
instruction for their children to be unreasonable); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (finding a statute that prevented parents from procuring private education to be
unreasonable); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding a statute that prevented
parents from procuring education conducted in languages other than English to be
unreasonable).
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courts must ask whether the state action forecloses or substantially hobbles
parents’ ability to procure desired educational opportunities for their
children, which are not inherently dangerous, inimical to the public
welfare,265 or justifiably curbed because of an emergency.266 If so, then the
state action has abridged parents’ Meyer-Pierce right.
This view of parental rights is consistent with cases like Fields, which find
parental interests substantially diminished in the public school setting.267 It
is also consistent with the original case law, as well as modern cases
involving parental rights in the context of private schools.268 Admittedly,
Runyon at first glance appears anomalous because the abridgement of racist
school admissions policies hobbles the ability of parents to procure
segregated educational environments for their children. However, this may
be explained by arguing (rightly) that racially segregated schooling is
inimical to the public welfare and within the substantive limits that the
original cases imposed on parental rights269—or, alternatively, that the state
action satisfied strict scrutiny.
While the reading of the Meyer-Pierce right set forth above is consistent
with the case law, it leaves open an area that must be clarified. Some parents
have argued, for example, that by regulating the school curriculum, the state
has abridged their Meyer-Pierce right by foreclosing their ability to not
expose their children to certain things.270 However, if this was the standard,
the state would not be able to affirmatively regulate anything in schools
without abridging parental rights, for any affirmative regulation of schools
prevents parents from choosing not to have their children subject to the
regulation. This cannot possibly be the scope of parental rights the original
cases contemplated because those cases explicitly acknowledged that the
state may affirmatively regulate schools.271 So, under Meyer and Pierce,
parents have a right to procure desired alternatives, but those desired
alternatives are still subject to reasonable regulation.272

265. Regarding the “intrinsically dangerous or manifestly inimical” qualification, the
Meyer Court asked whether the activity was necessarily harmful. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
Recall that the legislation in Meyer was promulgated to address a perceived threat of
German-American disloyalty. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. In the face of
this threat, the Court asked whether “[m]ere knowledge of the German language” was harmful,
rather than asking whether it could be harmful. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
266. An “emergency,” as contemplated by Meyer and Pierce, is a situation in which limited
information or alternative measures are reasonably available to the state to enable it to regulate
the risky activity without entirely prohibiting it. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 (“[M]ere abuse . . .
is not enough to justify . . . abolition, although regulation may be entirely proper.”).
267. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text; see also supra note 256.
268. See generally Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904 (9th Cir.) (finding parental rights
abridged by school closures and applying strict scrutiny), vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir.
2021) (mem.); Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d. 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
269. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1950) (discussing the
deleterious effects segregation has on minority communities).
270. See, e.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184–85 (3d. Cir. 2005).
271. See supra Part I.A.1–3 (discussing Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington).
272. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding Nebraska’s prohibition on the
teaching of German unreasonable but finding that “the power of the state . . . to make
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2. The Proper Level of Scrutiny for Abridgements of Parents’
Meyer-Pierce Right
Once the court determines that the state action in question has or has not
abridged parents’ Meyer-Pierce right, the next step is to properly scrutinize
the state action. If the court has determined that the state action has not
abridged parents’ Meyer-Pierce right, then the state need only satisfy rational
basis review.273 However, if the court determines that the state’s regulation
does abridge parents’ Meyer-Pierce right, then the state should have to satisfy
strict scrutiny. The reason strict scrutiny should apply is four-fold.
First, the analysis cannot end purely upon a finding that parents’ rights
have been abridged, as it would have under the original cases,274 because
doing so would privilege parental interests above any and all public interests,
no matter how compelling the public interests may be. This would
undermine one of the principal reasons the court developed the modern
framework: to properly balance the interests of individuals and the interests
of the voting public.275 Accordingly, states must still have the opportunity
to demonstrate that the action at issue was necessary.
Second, to apply anything less than strict scrutiny may lead to results
inconsistent with the original case law, contrary to Judge Hurwitz’s
dissenting view in Brach.276 Rational basis review contemplates total
deference to the state, which cannot be reconciled with the results in Meyer,
Pierce, or Farrington,277 and while intermediate scrutiny allows for closer
scrutiny than rational basis review, it also may lead to results inconsistent
with the original case law because it does not provide the certainty of
outcome that rational basis review and strict scrutiny do.278 Moreover, the
ambiguity of the intermediate scrutiny standard has the propensity to
reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions
in English, is not questioned” (emphasis added)).
273. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1208 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“[G]overnment actions that do not affect fundamental rights . . . will be upheld if they are
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
274. Under the “reasonableness” test as applied in Meyer-Pierce, finding parental rights
abridged through a determination that the state action in question was “unreasonable” was
sufficient to deem the law at issue unconstitutional. See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 (finding
Nebraska’s law to be unreasonable and striking it down).
275. See TRIBE, supra note 46, § 16-5, at 1451, § 16-6, at 1451–54.
276. Judge Hurwitz in Brach v. Newsom argued that even if parental rights were abridged,
rational basis should still apply, lest a host of reasonable regulations otherwise fail. See 6 F.4th
904, 945 (9th Cir.) (Hurwitz, J., dissenting), vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
However, this analysis mischaracterizes the function of the “reasonable relation” test as only
relating to the level of scrutiny the right is entitled to. As noted above, a finding of
reasonableness served to determine both whether the law was unconstitutional and whether
the parental right was protected against state action. See supra notes 242–45 and
accompanying text. Hence, there could never be a reasonable regulation that infringed on
parental rights under the original test, contrary to Judge Hurwitz’s analysis, because a
regulation abridging parental rights was necessarily unreasonable. See supra notes 242–43 and
accompanying text.
277. See supra Part III.A.1; see also supra note 149 and accompanying text.
278. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the
ambiguous nature of intermediate scrutiny).
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facilitate judicial activism.279 Hence, in the interest of promoting the modern
framework’s goal of limiting judicial activism, strict scrutiny, rather than
intermediate scrutiny, should apply.280
Third, strict scrutiny should apply because the Meyer-Pierce right has long
been regarded as “fundamental” by the Court,281 and courts routinely apply
strict scrutiny to abridgements of fundamental rights under the modern
framework.282 As the anthology of the Meyer-Pierce jurisprudence
acknowledges, parental authority over children’s education is “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”283 Indeed, the “primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition.”284 Hence, there is little question, then,
that the Court understands the Meyer-Pierce right to be fundamental. On that
basis, the right merits the protection afforded by strict scrutiny.
Fourth, from a policy perspective, the Meyer-Pierce right should receive
heightened protection against state action because parents are generally
better positioned to further their children’s educational interests than the
state.285 School closures have been detrimental to children’s education in
part because of the inadequacies of the virtual mode of instruction.286 What’s
more, states have alternative mitigation strategies available to them that
allow in-person instruction to continue.287 Providing parental rights
heightened protection will help ensure that states adequately balance the
interests of children’s education with public health goals and utilize
alternative mitigation measures where they are available and practicable.288
B. School Closures May Infringe on Parents’ Meyer-Pierce Right
Having laid out the proper test to analyze Meyer-Pierce claims, this Note
concludes that in certain cases, the closure of private schools unreasonably
abridges parental rights and should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny.

279. See id. (arguing that intermediate scrutiny “invite[s] subjective judicial preferences or
prejudices”); supra Part I.A; see also supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
280. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (noting that intermediate scrutiny invites “judicial
preferences”). In contrast to intermediate scrutiny, scholars note that strict scrutiny and
rational basis review tend to lead to the same results, suggesting that they may curb judgments
influenced by judicial preferences. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 149, at 8.
281. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121–22 (1989); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487–88 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
282. See supra Part I; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (stating that fundamental rights require
heightened scrutiny); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Brach, 6 F.4th at 931.
283. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
284. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
285. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 177–84 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
288. See Huntington & Scott, supra note 169, at 1416–17 (noting that robust protection of
parental rights can help safeguard children’s well-being).
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1. Whether School Closures Abridge Parents’ Meyer-Pierce Right
To determine whether school closures unreasonably abridge parental
rights, we must determine (1) whether they foreclose or substantially hobble
the ability of parents to procure certain types of alternative education they
desire for their children and (2) whether in-person instruction is inherently
dangerous, inimical to the public welfare, or justifiably regulated because of
the COVID-19 pandemic.289
As to the first question, by prohibiting the carrying on of in-person
instruction, the closure of private schools290 unquestionably hobbles parents’
ability to procure alternative forms of desired instruction for their children.291
Thus, we turn to the second question.
Answering the second question is more difficult because the answer is
highly fact-dependent. The spread of deadly communicable diseases, like
COVID-19, surely renders in-person education risky. And the spread of
COVID-19 is undoubtedly inimical to the public welfare. Yet, the proper
question under Meyer and Pierce is whether the activity is necessarily
harmful.292 And where mitigation measures are in place, in-person
instruction has largely proven to be safe.293 Thus, in-person instruction is
not necessarily harmful or inimical to the public welfare as contemplated by
Meyer and Pierce.294
However, as noted above, the analysis does not end there, for it must next
be determined whether school closures could be justified on the basis of an
“emergency.”295 The Meyer Court presumed that where alternative measures
were available to effectuate the state’s goals, completely prohibiting the risky
activity was unreasonable.296 Accordingly, school closures occurring at the
onset of a public health crisis like COVID-19 will surely be reasonable, as
states may have limited access to information and alternative measures and
will need to act swiftly and broadly to limit the spread of the disease.297
289. See supra Part III.A.1.
290. As noted above, closing public schools does not in and of itself foreclose the ability
of parents to procure in-person private school instruction, if they so desire and are able to. See
supra note 256 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 177 (discussing parents’ frustration over virtual learning).
292. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. Of course, where mitigation measures are
insufficient to maintain control of viral spread or hospitalization rates, in-person education
may be properly considered dangerous or inimical to public health. Cf. HARRIS ET AL., supra
note 189, at 5 (suggesting that in-person instruction may be unsafe where hospitalization rates
exceed 36 to 44 per 100,000 people per week).
295. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
296. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
297. See Green, supra note 185, at 1 (noting the dearth of information, data, and guidance
regarding the necessity and efficacy of school closures early in the COVID-19 pandemic); see
also S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (noting that states must have “especially broad” latitude when acting in
“areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties” (quoting Marshall v. United States,
414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974))); Thomson, supra note 236, at 7–8 (noting the need for judicial
deference early in crises).
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However, when and if information and mitigation measures become
available and feasible such that schools may reopen safely, the “emergency”
justifying wholesale closures has likely come to an end.298
Thus, although the three-judge panel Brach majority opinion has since
been vacated, and although its analysis differed from the test set forth in this
Note, the panel was correct in finding that California’s public health policy
abridged parental rights under the scope of Meyer and Pierce because closing
private schools completely foreclosed parents’ opportunity to procure
in-person education for their children.299 Moreover, in-person learning in
California was not necessarily harmful,300 and California’s regulations were
“far more severe than ha[d] been shown to be required to prevent the spread
of [COVID-19],”301 such that they were no longer justified on the basis of an
“emergency.”
2. Whether School Closures Can Satisfy Strict Scrutiny
Having determined that school closures may indeed abridge parental rights
under certain circumstances, in such cases they must satisfy strict scrutiny.302
Culling the spread of COVID-19 and other diseases is “unquestionably a
compelling [state] interest.”303 Turning to whether closures are narrowly
tailored, Brach is instructive.304 Where public health measures, like
298. See Thomson, supra note 236, at 7–8 (stressing the need for courts to distinguish
between an ongoing crisis and a managed one in determining whether to afford states greater
deference). This view of what constitutes an “emergency” is also supported by the Court’s
COVID-19 jurisprudence. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613–14
(Roberts, C.J., concurring); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that while deference may be warranted early on
during pandemics, as states learn to combat the disease, deference is no longer warranted).
However, the presence and potential spread of COVID-19 would still constitute an
“emergency” reasonably justifying the implementation of mitigation measures such as mask
mandates, attendance caps, and the like, unless it could be shown that less stringent
alternatives are available and practicable. So, if parents, for example, level challenges against
mask mandates as entirely foreclosing their ability to obtain the kind of face-to-face, in-person
instruction they desire for their children in private school, so long as the evidence does not
suggest that alternatives are available and practicable, the mandates would, for the purpose of
Meyer and Pierce, still likely be justified by an “emergency.” See supra note 266 and
accompanying text.
299. See Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904, 929 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that California’s
reopening framework deprived parents of the ability to send their children to private school);
see also Blume, supra note 198 (noting that some students in California were precluded from
attending school in person for upwards of one year).
300. “On this record, the State’s concerns about transmission would justify a potential
range of more narrowly drawn prophylactic measures within schools to mitigate such risks; it
cannot justify wholesale closure.” Brach, 6 F.4th at 932, vacated, 18 F.4th 1031 (9th Cir.
2021) (mem.).
301. Id. at 931 (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67).
302. The mere context of a pandemic does not on its own justify imposing lesser scrutiny.
See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 68.
303. Id. at 67.
304. See Part II.B.2. It is important to note that Brach only answered whether California’s
evidence was sufficient to demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was
narrowly tailored. See Brach, 6 F.4th at 933 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the state).
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California’s, are more stringent than those imposed by other jurisdictions,
they may be unnecessary to cull the spread of COVID-19.305 Moreover, the
availability of less restrictive alternative measures indicates that school
closures may be unnecessary.306 Additionally, if the state has barred
in-person learning but allowed other comparable activities to continue in
person, then school closures may be unnecessary to achieve the state’s
goals.307 Accordingly, where parents can establish that school closures
abridge their rights under the scope of Meyer and Pierce and where the state
is unable to satisfy strict scrutiny, such school closures are indeed
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
While the Meyer-Pierce right has long received protection from courts,
current attempts to analyze the right under the modern framework risk both
underprotecting and overprotecting parental rights. COVID-19 school
closures have burdened families, and they portend long-term damage for the
futures of the children affected by them. Since parents serve as the best
advocates for their children’s education and future, courts must ensure that
parental rights are adequately protected. However, public health crises
demand immediate action from states to adequately safeguard the public
from disease. As such, courts must also ensure that a proper balance is being
struck between the interests of the public and of parents. To strike this
balance, courts must first determine whether the state action has completely
foreclosed or substantially hobbled parents’ ability to procure educational
opportunities for their children as desired. If so, courts must determine
whether the state action can be justified by either an emergency or any
intrinsic public or private harm those educational options may cause. If not,
then the state action has abridged parents’ Meyer-Pierce right and must
satisfy strict scrutiny.

305. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67 (finding regulations that were “far
more restrictive” than those adopted in other jurisdictions to be insufficiently narrowly
tailored). However, this finding on its own should not be dispositive because it is possible
that the state’s goals are more aggressive than those in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the facts
on the ground may differ between states. Hence, the question is whether the state’s actions
are necessary to effectuate those more aggressive compelling goals or respond to their unique
situations.
306. See Brach, 6 F.4th at 932 (noting that the record was not sufficient to justify closures
but was sufficient to justify other less restrictive regulations); see also supra notes 186–90 and
accompanying text.
307. See Brach, 6 F.4th at 932 (finding the state’s failure to justify prohibiting in-person
education while allowing other comparable activities to continue in person to be insufficient
to satisfy strict scrutiny); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67 (“It is hard to
believe that admitting more than 10 people to a 1,000-seat church or 400-seat synagogue
would create a more serious health risk than the many other activities that the State allows.”).

